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I am in some very real sense off my own turf this morning. I am a practicing
international banker, not a lawyer, not a government official. As a practicing
international banker, that simply means I lend to customers whose residence is
outside the continental limits of the United States.
Without for a moment attempting to inject a sour note into the proceedings, I
intend to share with you in a somewhat detailed fashion the outlook and concerns
of a major international bank when asked to lend to the Soviet government or
another COMECON government, to finance a United States export into the
Eastern Bloc, or from time to time to lend to a joint venture.
Two years ago, it was fashionable for all major international banks to be
developing ambitious plans to become rapidly involved in COMECON countries.
They seemed to offer a virgin market of enormous proportions, and one year ago,
to change the metaphor, most of us were at that point with a foot in the door and
waiting with some impatience for the passage of the Trade Act. However, time
and circumstances have changed. A congressional campaign to use economic
leverage to change Soviet emigration policy dampened much of the heady
enthusiasm in Washington board rooms, New York board rooms, and public
relations offices. The Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent Soviet reactions abruptly
ended the more extravagant hopes of American business born in 1970, 1971, and
1972.
I think it is generally agreed now in the American business community that the
difficulties in expanding trade with COMECON countries were greatly under-
rated a couple of years ago. Total Soviet imports in 1974 were $27 billion, of which
a little over half came from other Communist countries. In terms of the context of
United States foreign trade, these are not staggeringly important figures. West
Germany has been the U.S.S.R.'s most important Western foreign trade partner.
Fifteen years ago, the Soviet Union was fifteenth on Western Germany's trade
list. Today, they are thirteenth. Under the most optimistic of assumptions, the
United States in 1980 might account for four percent of Soviet exports and six
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percent of her imports. Even these modest goals presuppose MFN status and con-
tinued progress toward detente.
I think we have to make genuine distinctions between the financial
circumstances of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the other COMECON
countries on the other. Some months ago, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic
Council suggested that sixty percent to seventy percent of all Soviet imports from
the United States would have to be financed. On the other hand, the United States
press gave substantial publicity to a recent CIA study which indicated that the
U.S.S.R., due to high prices of exports, may have enjoyed a $1 billion foreign
trade surplus last year. That study forecast that Soviet exports to the West might
increase from $7.5 million this year to $25 billion or $30 billion in 1985. It would
appear logical to assume that the Soviet Union will be able to pay for a substantial
volume of goods she wants to purchase from us within substantial trade credits.
On the other hand, it has been authoritatively estimated, and one can do nothing
but make estimates in these cases, that the international debt of the other
Eastern European countries today may be $10-15 billion. It is estimated that
last year, the Socialist countries, excluding the U.S.S.R., had an aggregate
trade deficit with the West of $8 billion. If these trends continue, the other
COMECON countries might have an external debt to the West of $15-30 billion
by 1985, and they will, indeed, require financing if they are to make substantial
purchases from the United States and other Western European countries.
'I ne whole area of national export credits lends itself to humor if you are at all
cynical. A couple of weeks ago, Barron's reported that the Soviets have bought
$6 million worth of telecommunications equipment from France, with financing
offered at a rate of 7 percent. At the same time, my own bank was financing $29
million of imports of telephone equipment into France at a rate substantially in
excess of that. Great Britain has offered the Soviet Union a line of $2.5 billion at a
rate of approximately 7.5 percent, while being forced to borrow in international
markets at anywhere from 12 to 14 percent to finance her own trade deficits. One
has to wonder for how long and for what tenor other Western nations are going to
be willing to do this, how much they are going to be willing to pay, and how much
risk they are going to be willing to assume in order to finance their own exports to
the Soviet Bloc.
The entire United States international banking and business community
deplores the fact that MFN status has not been granted generally. We deplore the
fact that there are limitations on Eximbank financing to the Soviet Bloc. But I
think in some sense the international business community has overstated its case.
The present mild crisis in the United States-Soviet relations does not constitute an
irreparable breakdown in our trade relations but may have served simply to dispel
a wide range of illusions which grew up a couple of years ago, and which would
have been dispelled sooner or later if Congress had not tampered with the Trade
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Act. It has been said repeatedly that a great opportunity has been lost in the Trade
Bill, but one wonders whether even under optimal conditions, the volume of
trade, for example, between the United States and the Soviet Union or the United
States and the other Eastern Europe countries would ever be of critical
importance to either. I think it is important that this be placed in context. I
wonder if the whole subject couldn't do with a period of benign neglect, during
which time, without speeches, without conferences, without congressional
investigations, East-West trade could grow in a quiet, organic, natural way,
dependent upon the resourcefulness and ingenuity of lawyers, on the one hand,
and Socialist officials and American businessmen on the other.
Another aspect of change in the banking communities, another aspect of doing
business with COMECON countries has been more financial than geopolitical.
We have moved in the world of international finance into a lender's market.
American banks, like banks throughout the Western world, are under substantial
constraints not to increase loans. We are under the constraint of capital
inadequacy within our own respective institutions.
For the past several years, regulatory authorities in this country have expressed
repeated concern about the volume of our risk assets in relation to our capital. In
a worldwide climate of higher demand for loans than available resources, we have
had to make some hard choices. This has forced us to be more selective in regard
to risks and more demanding with respect to rewards.
Let us take a look at an actual transaction that came across my desk recently. It
involved a large, stable, financially respected Socialist country wishing to lease
certain equipment to develop energy resources. Representatives of the country
were interested in a lease because it involves special features of no down
payments, equal payments over a period of time, and a fixed interest rate. From
my point of view, a financial lease to a Socialist country is simply a term loan at
fixed interest rates, since we are not concerned with repossession of the
equipment in that country. In view of the large size of the order, delivery will take
place two years from now. The debtor has suggested that payment be spread over
a ten-year period. We, therefore, need to measure this proposal, which is a typical
proposal in a major international bank, against some of our current lending
criteria.
The borrower, or lessee, is seeking a credit at a fixed rate of interest for ten
years, which, in the first place is unacceptable, primarily because we banks are
totally skeptical of our ability to forecast our money costs for that long. Only
recently have some Socialist country banks been willing to pay floating interest
rates. Even with a margin of one and one-half percent over the cost of money, it is
doubtful we could sell a ten-year loan today. It is becoming increasingly difficult
to interest American banks or Western European banks in loans of this tenor.
The COMECON borrower, on the other hand, has a reputation so solid and so
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financially secure that we feel we might consider an exposure of eight years. This
would involve a two-year period for the manufacturer to assemble, fabricate, and
ship the equipment. During this period, we would collect a commitment fee.
We have had a very difficult time trying to convince our friends in COMECON
countries that in order to tap the United States' financial and international
banking markets for significant sums of money, they are simply going to have to
pay commercial rates. This has been a difficult task for a number of reasons, part
of which are our own fault. In the first place, the Soviets and other COMECON
countries enjoyed what, in hind sight, appears to be absurdly low rates of interest
in the late 1960s and early 1970s-three-eights or one-half percent over the cost of
money on a ten-year loan. Secondly, this phenomenon arose because the Socialist
countries are smart enough to have only one borrower, and a steady stream of
bankers goes by Dr. Salusinszky's office offering him untold quantities of money
at very preferential rates which, obviously, puts them in an extremely good
bargaining position.
Our perceptions as to what is attractive business have changed substantially in
the last year or two. The most crucial consideration in lending money is not lend-
ing it but getting it back. Or, as the lady says, she has no fear of flying, just of
crashing. We are all familiar with the scrupulous payment record of the COME-
CON countries. But in international banking, I have come to the conclusion
that the inevitable seldom occurs, and the unforeseen, always. The probability
of unforeseen events occurring in the next ten years bears a mathematical
relationship to the length of time our loan is outstanding. More dangerous than
the unprofitable operations of the enterprise itself would be a national shortage of
convertible currency. But, here again, their ability to handle their affairs in this
area has been exemplary. Socialist countries of Eastern Europe have enjoyed an
extraordinary credit rating among Western banking circles, despite the fact that
we don't have data on their balance of payments, their level of international
reserves or the burden of their international indebtedness. Why? For two reasons:
1) the excellent historical record; and 2) the monopoly of foreign trade and foreign
currency operations which permit them to deal rapidly and effectively with any
foreign exchange problem.
One last factor which forces us to be selective in dealing with COMECON
countries is a constraint known in the trade as our legal lending limit. The law
provides that no bank can lend to any person, partnership, or corporation an
amount in excess often percent of its capital and reserves. The exception to that is
a loan to a foreign government or an institution which bears the full faith and
credit of a foreign government. So far, the COMECON countries have been
unwilling to provide private United States banks their full faith and credit
guarantee on the obligations of the foreign trade banks in their countries. That
means that a bank like my own, the fourth largest in the United States, has a total
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practical legal lending limit in most COMECON countries of $100 million,
whereas there are a great many developing countries in the world where we have
more than that at risk. We have an internal house limit of somewhat less than that
for each individual borrower.
Consider if you will the total legal lending limit of all American banks. It is
something like $2.5 billion. Of this amount, about $300 million, for example, is
already at risk with the U.S.S.R.'s Vneshtorgbank. Of the remaining sum, it
would be my estimate that one-half will not be lent under any circumstances,
and that is so for several reasons, not the least of which is a great many Amer-
ican banks are not in international banking.
We are left with less than $1 billion of total credit which can now be lent to the
Soviet Union by the entire American banking system. This may sound like a lot of
money, and, indeed, it is, but within my own bank in the last several months, two
projects have been discussed by American corporations, each one of which would
take half of the entire remaining legal lending limit of the American banking
system.
Another United States bank, a California bank, has offered a credit line to the
Soviets which would take up the other half, and, at that point, we are out of
business.
A last nagging problem for which I ask the American Bar Association's
counsel. The Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934 continues to nag us. It is inter-
preted as meaning that it is a criminal offense for any bank or person in this
country to extend a loan to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union,
or, possibly, the German Democratic Republic, except for the normal financing
of United States export sales.
As all of you know, we consider, for reasons that aren't entirely clear to me,
loans to these countries which go far beyond the normal export sales pattern.
Banks are often asked to make this kind of loan, and I ask you lawyers what our
response should be.
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